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DICTATORSHIP OFFICIALS IN “DIRTY
WAR” CASES
“La tortura psicológica … es tanto o más terri-
ble que la física, aunque sean dos cosas que no
se pueden comparar ya que una procura llegar
a los umbrales del dolor. La capucha procura la
desesperación, la angustia y la locura.” —
Lisandro Raúl Cubas, Argentine torture
camp survivor. 
“Psychological torture is much worse than
physical torture, although they are two things
that cannot be compared because one strives to
reach the limits of pain and the other produces
desperation, anguish, and madness.” 
From 1976 to 1983 the Argentine mili-
tary junta subjected citizens to torture and
other cruel, inhuman, and degrading treat-
ment. During that period, the junta engaged
in kidnappings, tortures, and disappearances
against leftist militants, dissidents, and intel-
lectuals, which resulted in a death toll esti-
mated at anywhere between 10,000 and
30,000 individuals. Although some high-
ranking officials were tried and sentenced in
the mid-1980s, the military staged two
mutinies in an attempt to restrict the efforts
of prosecutors to hold military officers legal-
ly accountable. These violent mutinies
prompted former President Raul Alfonsín to
enact amnesty laws designed to achieve what
he referred to as “national reconciliation.”
For the 20 years that followed, officials
responsible for the perpetration of human
rights abuses relied on the protection of
these laws to avoid prosecution for the atroc-
ities they committed. 
This June, however, the Supreme Court
of Argentina upheld a 2001 lower court rul-
ing that overturned Argentina’s amnesty laws
on constitutional grounds, allowing prose-
cutors to move forward with investigations
of ex-military officials implicated in crimenes
de lesa humanidad (crimes against humanity)
committed during the “Dirty War.” The
Supreme Court of Argentina found the “full
stop” and “due obedience” laws unconstitu-
tional by a seven-to-one vote. The full stop
law shielded high-ranking officers from
criminal and civil prosecution, while the due
obedience law provided that all lower rank-
ing officials could not be held accountable
because they were legally forced to carry out
orders from their superiors. 
Since this historic judicial decision, sever-
al members of the former dictatorship have
found themselves in court. Perhaps one of
the most significant cases is the prosecution
of General Juan Antonio “Colores” Del
Cerro and five other high-ranking military
officers for the crimes of torture and kidnap-
ping. The case was approved for oral argu-
ments before the Court of Cassation by fed-
eral judge Daniel Rafecas on September 12,
2005. Del Cerro is allegedly responsible for
directing the operations of one of several
clandestine torture camps during the dicta-
torship. Specifically, Del Cerro specialized in
electric shock as a method for the interroga-
tion of prisoners and organized groups of sol-
diers that carried out the systematic kidnap-
pings of men, women, and children believed
to be anti-government sympathizers. His
official charge alleges responsibility for mul-
tiple counts of torture, as well as the kidnap-
ping of a child born to one of his detainees.
Del Cerro is also accused of facilitating the
disappearance of two Argentines and the sub-
sequent adoption of their infant daughter by
a fellow military official. In addition to Del
Cerro, many of the junta’s top officials,
including General Jorge Videla and Admiral
Emilio Massera, are currently confined to
house arrest on charges of kidnapping babies
born to mothers held in captivity. 
The importance of the abolition of
amnesty for individuals implicated in
human rights abuses during the “Dirty War”
may well extend beyond the limits of
Argentina’s judicial system. It could give
other countries, such as Uruguay, Chile, and
Colombia, the political momentum to
address the constitutionality of their own
amnesty laws. In the words of José Miguel
Vivanco, Latin America and Caribbean
Program Director for Human Rights Watch,
“The crimes of the Dirty War are far too
serious to be amnestied and forgotten, the
era of sweetheart deals for the military,
extracted at gunpoint from democratic lead-
ers, is over.”
COLOMBIAN JUSTICE AND PEACE LAW
In an effort to put an end to the guerilla
and paramilitary violence that has over-
whelmed the country for the last 40 years,
the Colombian Congress ratified the Justice
and Peace Law in July 2005. At first glance,
this legislation appears to be a step in the
right direction toward reducing violence
within the country. Many human rights
groups, however, are exposing devastating
flaws in the framework of this law, focusing
primarily on the de facto amnesty it grants to
guerrillas and paramilitaries through various
procedural benefits. 
These procedural benefits include signif-
icantly reduced prison sentences, short time-
frames for the investigation of crimes
(including war crimes and crimes against
humanity), and an apparent disregard for
the rights of victims to demand the truth
and seek justice. According to the new legis-
lation, combatants who demobilize will
receive prison sentences of 5-8 years, regard-
less of the nature of the crimes for which
they are implicated. Further, procedural
requirements under the new law only give
investigators a 36-hour window in which to
charge a suspect, despite the complexities of
the crimes involved and the large number of
potential defendants. 
In addition to the time constraint, the law
provides for what many organizations,
including Amnesty International, Human
Rights Watch, and the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights have deemed
an inadequate mechanism to perform the task
effectively. The newly appointed Prosecutor’s
National Unit for Justice and Peace is com-
posed of only 20 prosecutors. Furthermore,
there is no provision in place to account for
false testimony given by guerrillas and para-
militaries who provide information to receive
the procedural benefits outlined above. As it
stands, individuals may take advantage of the
shorter prison sentences regardless of the
validity of the information they provide pros-
ecutors and investigators.
The negative effects of this potential flaw
are twofold. First, fabricated testimony will
almost certainly hinder the investigation of
crimes by sending law enforcement officials
on fruitless searches. Second, and perhaps
more importantly, inaccurate representa-
tions of the facts involved in any particular
case will compromise efforts to establish
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individual responsibility. Consequently,
countless violent offenders benefit from an
implicit amnesty that ultimately results in an
inability to provide victims with truthful
accounts of what happened to both them
and to their families. Although the deactiva-
tion of combatants is of the utmost impor-
tance to achieve peace and end hostilities
within the country, the victims must receive
reparations through the adjudication and
punishment of these crimes. 
AFRICA
AFRICAN UNION
During its 5th Ordinary Session from July
4-5, 2005, in Sirte, Libya, the African Union
(AU) adopted a decision to draft a legal instru-
ment for the planned merger of the African
Commission on Human and People’s Rights
(Commission), the African Court on Human
and People’s Rights (ACHPR), and the African
Union’s Court of Justice. Mr. Mohammed
Bedjaoui, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the
Republic of Algeria and former President of
the International Court of Justice, agreed to
contribute to the document. The Executive
Council and the Assembly will consider the
instrument at their next ordinary sessions,
scheduled for January 23-24, 2006, in
Khartoum, Sudan. 
The African Union and Solidarity for
African Women’s Rights Coalition co-con-
vened a conference addressing implementa-
tion of the Protocol to the African Charter
on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the
Rights of Women from September 27-30,
2005, in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Heads of
State and the Government of the AU adopt-
ed the Protocol on July 11, 2003. A year
later they adopted the Solemn Declaration
on Gender Equality in Africa, aiming to sign
and ratify the Protocol by the end of 2004.
To date, 13 countries have ratified the
Protocol: Cape Verde, Comoros, Djibouti,
the Gambia, Lesotho, Libya, Malawi, Mali,
Namibia, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, and
South Africa. Two additional countries are
required for the Protocol to be enacted. The
conference focused on moving from cam-
paigns for the Protocol’s ratification to
strategies for its implementation. Planned
outputs include national and regional action
plans, a booklet on strategies and options for
domestication and implementation, and an
outline for a campaign strategy on strength-
ening women’s access to justice under the
Protocol’s provisions.
CHAD
On September 19, 2005, a Belgian court
issued a warrant for the arrest and extradi-
tion of former Chadian president, Hissene
Habré, on charges of torture and other
atrocities committed during his rule from
1982-1990. After a military coup in 1990,
Habré fled to Senegal where he currently
lives in exile. The warrant was issued under
Belgium’s universal jurisdiction law, which
allows for the prosecution of genocide,
crimes against humanity, or war crimes,
regardless of where they are committed or
the nationalities of the perpetrators or vic-
tims. Under pressure from the United States,
Belgium modified the law in August 2003 to
require that an accused be either a Belgian
national or have his/her primary residence in
the country, but the Habré case was allowed
to go forward because the investigation was
already underway and three of the plaintiffs
were Belgian citizens.
The extradition comes after a long and
circuitous effort to hold Habré accountable
for his brutal rule. A 1992 truth commission
accused his regime of systematic torture and
over 40,000 political murders. In 2000 a
Senegalese court charged Habré with torture
and crimes against humanity, but a year later
Senegal’s highest court (Cour de Cassation)
ruled that he could not be tried in Senegal
for crimes committed elsewhere.
Meanwhile, another group of victims filed
suit in Belgium and sought Habré’s extradi-
tion to stand trial there. Shortly after the
Senegalese court ruled that it could not try
Habré’s case, Senegal’s President, Abdoulaye
Wade, moved to expel him from the country
as an act of support for Habré’s victims. The
victims, however, feared that an expulsion
from Senegal would make Habré even hard-
er to reach. They called on the UN
Committee against Torture and UN
Secretary General Kofi Annan, who asked
President Wade to hold Habré in Senegal
pending Belgium’s extradition request.
President Wade agreed and has expressed
support for the issued request. Chad’s gov-
ernment has also voiced its support.
If successful, Habré could become the
first former president ever extradited in
another country’s courts on charges of
human rights violations. At the time of pub-
lication, the extradition request was on its
way to the Indicting Chamber of the Dakar
Appeals Court. Habré has the right to chal-
lenge his extradition there. If the court rules
that Habré may be extradited, President
Wade can choose to sign the extradition
decree and send the former ruler to stand
trial in Belgium.
RWANDA
Over 1,000 Rwandans convicted of
genocide by community courts were sen-
tenced to community service as punishment
for their role in the 1994 killings. The com-
munity courts, known as Gacaca, were estab-
lished to expedite the judicial process for
approximately 760,000 Rwandans accused
of committing crimes during the genocide.
Gacaca judges are elected by their communi-
ties and can order punishments of up to 30
years in prison for those found guilty of vol-
untary homicide, violent acts without intent
to kill, or crimes against property. Only offi-
cial Rwandan courts may try principal
organizers of the genocide, those who acted
in positions of authority, and those alleged
to have committed rape and sexual torture,
and only these courts may hand out death
sentences. 
Under Gacaca court law, convicts are
permitted to serve half of their sentences
performing community service rather than
remaining in jail. Convicts will build homes
for genocide survivors, children orphaned by
HIV/AIDS, and other vulnerable members
of the community; work on soil erosion
projects, construct roads and schools; and
perform any other tasks the government
deems appropriate. A recent amendment
made this service component mandatory for
those convicted by Gacaca courts, with the
exception of those who continue to deny
their guilt. Because most of the convicts
starting service projects confessed their roles
in the genocide and had already spent half
their sentences incarcerated while awaiting
trial, they could not be sent back to prison.
Proponents of the community service
system say that it holds perpetrators
accountable for their actions, promotes rec-
onciliation and healing among communi-
ties, and contributes to the rebuilding of the
country. Many genocide survivors, however,
are angered at the release of the convicts
back into their communities and question
how much the community service will actu-
ally help those who were hurt most by their
actions. Genocide survivor Stanislas
Niyongabo commented, “Maybe this is
good for the country in general, but I don’t
see any direct benefit to survivors who lost
everything during the genocide.”
LIBERIA
On October 11, 2005, Liberians voted in
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their first presidential and legislative elec-
tions since the end of a 14-year civil war that
killed an estimated quarter of a million peo-
ple and displaced hundreds of thousands of
others. A November 8, 2005, runoff election
was scheduled for the top two presidential
candidates, George Weah of the Congress
for Democratic Change (CDC) and Ellen
Johnson Sirleaf of the Unity Party (UP).
Weah is best known as an international soc-
cer star and Sirleaf is a Harvard-educated
economist who has worked for the World
Bank and the United Nations. On
November 11, 2005, Sirleaf claimed victory
as the first woman to be elected president of
Liberia, or anywhere in Africa, garnering
59.1 percent of the vote. 
The elections were a key part of the
Liberian peace agreement negotiated by the
Economic Community of West African
States (ECOWAS) and signed by an interim
Liberian government and rebels in August
2003. Local and international observers who
monitored the electoral process have agreed
that the elections were free, fair, transparent,
and peaceful. The Liberian National Police
and United Nations police quickly brought
minor incidents under control. Voter
turnout was reportedly very high, with many
Liberians waiting over 12 hours in the sun
for an opportunity to cast their votes. 
MIDDLE EAST
OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES
AUTHOR’S NOTE: The following discusses
the barrier Israel is building in the Occupied
Palestinian Territories (OPT), the nomen-
clature of which requires some explanation.
The structure itself takes the form of a 25-
foot-high concrete wall in some areas, and a
9-foot-high electronic fence, layered with
razor wire, trenches, military patrol roads,
and surveillance cameras, in other areas.
Palestinians refer to the structure as the
“Separation Wall,” “Apartheid Wall,” or
“Annexation Wall,” referencing the barrier’s
location, its impact on Palestinian move-
ment, and its division of farmland and water
resources. Israel refers to the barrier as the
“Security Fence,” arguing that the structure
is necessary for Israeli security. The
International Court of Justice (ICJ) referred
to it as a wall in its advisory opinion. Here,
the term barrier is used because it incorpo-
rates both of these meanings. When quoting
or referring to the ICJ, or when quoting
Palestinian or Israeli sources, the Human
Rights Brief uses their respective terminology.
As reported in “Legal Consequences of
the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory,” 11 No. 2 Hum. Rts.
Brief, the ICJ issued an Advisory Opinion
on July 9, 2004, finding that “[t]he con-
struction of the wall being built by Israel, the
occupying Power, in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory (OPT), including in
and around East Jerusalem, and its associat-
ed regime, are contrary to international law.”
The ICJ opinion emphasized four key
points: (1) the illegality of the construction
of a wall in the OPT; (2) Israel’s obligation
to stop the construction of the wall in the
OPT and undo subsequent damage; (3) the
international community’s obligations vis-à-
vis the construction of the wall in the OPT;
and (4) the need for the United Nations to
consider further action to end this illegal sit-
uation. More than a year after the ICJ ren-
dered its opinion on the barrier that Israel is
building in the OPT, Palestinians — NGOs
and government officials alike — are seeking
ways to compel the implementation of the
decision and oblige the international com-
munity to live up to its commitment to
uphold international law.
Israel objects to the findings of the ICJ,
and has refused to acknowledge the legitima-
cy of what it has called a “politically motivat-
ed maneuver” and the “one-sided question
put before the Court.” According to Israel’s
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the “Advisory
Opinion fails to address the essence of the
problem and the very reason for building the
fence — Palestinian terrorism.” Within
hours of the ruling, Israeli officials said that
they would not abide by the decision’s provi-
sions and Foreign Minister Silvan Shalom
specifically stated that “Israel will continue
building the security fence.” In February
2005 the Israeli Ministry of Justice issued a
written brief on the legal implications of the
ICJ’s Advisory Opinion. The brief argued
that the factual basis of the Court’s opinion
was inexact, outdated, and irrelevant due to
changes that the Israeli government had
made in the barrier’s route and “improve-
ments” in providing for the needs of affected
Palestinians. 
The Ministry of Justice brief referred to
changes in the route ordered by the Israeli
Supreme Court. On June 30, 2004, nine
days before the ICJ delivered its advisory
opinion, the Israeli Supreme Court ruled
that a section of the barrier in the West Bank
violated the rights of thousands of
Palestinian residents by separating them
from their farmland in “a veritable choke-
hold, which will severely stifle daily life” and
ordered the Israeli military to reconsider the
route. The high court ordered changes to
approximately 18 miles of the planned 450-
mile barrier system but it did not suggest a
new route or set timelines for the changes.
On February 20, 2005, the Israeli govern-
ment approved a new route for the barrier.
This route, however, remains problematic
because an estimated 80 percent of the path
of the barrier remains inside the OPT and
still results in the annexation of approxi-
mately 10 percent of the West Bank, a viola-
tion of the ICJ Opinion and the legal prin-
ciple prohibiting the acquisition of territory
by the use of force. In addition, Israel’s
unchanged system of permits, checkpoints,
gates, and closed zones enables the Israeli
military to control 46 percent of the occu-
pied West Bank in violation of the principles
of international human rights law empha-
sized by the ICJ Opinion.
Palestinians have become convinced of
Israel’s intransigence and are seeking action
from the international community on four
obligations outlined in the Advisory
Opinion: (1) to acknowledge the illegal situ-
ation resulting from the wall’s construction
in the OPT; (2) to provide neither aid nor
assistance in maintaining the situation creat-
ed by its construction; (3) for all High
Contracting Parties to the Fourth Geneva
Convention to uphold their obligations
under Common Article 1 and ensure respect
of the Convention; and (4) for the UN to
consider what further action is required to
halt the illegal situation resulting from the
Wall’s construction in the OPT. Palestinians
further argue that if security was Israel’s pri-
mary consideration, it would have been
most pragmatic to build the barrier along
the Green Line, the internationally recog-
nized border between Israel and the OPT.
Instead, the barrier cuts deep into the West
Bank, isolating Palestinians from much of
their land and resources. In June 2005 Israeli
officials testified in an Israeli court that the
decision to construct the barrier in the
Jerusalem area stems from political consider-
ations, in addition to security purposes. 
Although the ICJ defines Advisory
Opinions as principally consultative in char-
acter, Palestinian Foreign Minister Nasser al-
Kidwa, who led the Palestinian delegation to
the Court, stated that “the decision of the
ICJ cited applicable international laws and
therefore is not merely advisory; all parties
are obliged to comply.” He also called on all
signatories to the Geneva Conventions to
take action to uphold the laws of the treaty.
In addition, more than 170 Palestinian
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organizations within and outside of the
OPT have issued a call for boycott, divest-
ments, and sanctions against Israel for its
failure to heed the ICJ opinion. For the
complete Advisory Opinion, see http://www
.ic j-c i j .org/ ic jwww/idocket / imwp/imw
pframe.htm.
ALGERIA
On September 29, 2005, Algerians took
to the polls to vote in a national referendum
aimed at ending over a decade of violence
that has left more than 100,000 individuals
dead. At stake was Algerian President
Abdelaziz Bouteflika’s “Charter for Peace
and National Reconciliation.” The Charter
presents a plan to move Algeria out of the
chaos and mayhem that has racked the
country since the military cancelled legisla-
tive elections in 1992, when it appeared that
an Islamic opposition group would win at
the polls. With relatively high turnout
reported by the government, the Charter
passed with a resounding majority. Algeria’s
two main opposition parties, however, made
claims of fraud after the initial results were
announced. Algerians were given six weeks
to review the Charter before going to vote,
to allow for open discussion and dialogue
about the plan. The tense political climate in
Algeria and the government’s general intol-
erance of opposition, however, restricted
open, democratic debate.
The Charter, designed to further what
Bouteflika describes as the peace and nation-
al reconciliation process begun by his 1999
Civil Harmony Law, Law No. 99-08, is
unprecedented in the country’s history and
rare for the region. Nonetheless, the plan is
controversial, both locally for its provision of
blanket amnesty for many perpetrators of
murder and other violent crimes and interna-
tionally for its failure to meet international
norms and human rights standards. In point-
ing out some of the serious deficiencies,
Human Rights Watch (HRW) noted that the
Charter does not mention the “duty of the
state to investigate serious human rights abus-
es, to prosecute those found responsible or to
address the right of families.” Further, HRW
argued that the Charter does not meet the
standards set by the United Nations Updated
Set of Principles for the Protection and
Promotion of Human Rights through Action
to Combat Impunity. According to these
Principles, states have a general obligation to
take action to combat impunity and victims
have an inalienable right to truth, justice, and
reparations. In a joint statement, Amnesty
International, Human Rights Watch, and the
International Federation for Human Rights
said, “a general amnesty would leave the her-
itage of the past unresolved and could under-
mine future prospects.”
From a human rights perspective the
Charter is problematic. It would end legal pro-
ceedings against detained, exiled, or fugitive
Islamic extremists “who have already halted
their armed activity,” and although “those
involved in mass massacres, rapes and bomb
attacks in public places” would be excluded
from the amnesty, the Charter does not define
what constitutes a “mass massacre.” According
to Human Rights Watch, the list of excludable
crimes is wholly inadequate, allowing pardon
for extrajudicial executions, murder, torture,
and forced disappearances.
The Charter also disregards the rights and
aspirations of families of the “disappeared.”
Although it recognizes state responsibility for
those who were “disappeared” and acknowl-
edges the need to help their families cope, it
does not make a similar commitment to pro-
vide families with information concerning the
fate of their missing relatives. The Charter pro-
vides for compensation for the beneficiaries of
the “disappeared,” but does not address the
issue of compensation to the “disappeared”
themselves. 
Further, the Charter excludes the Islamic
Salvation Front (FIS) from political life. The
FIS was set to win the majority of seats in the
1992 election; it remains banned and many of
its leaders are under constant surveillance or
threat from the government. By criminalizing
Algeria’s political opposition, the Charter vio-
lates the right of Algerians to freedom of asso-
ciation and the right to take part in self-gov-
ernment through free and fair elections as
guaranteed by Article 25 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
Although this Charter is an initial step
toward acknowledging and addressing the
crimes of the past, it does not go far enough in
adhering to both human rights standards and
the expectations of Algerians and the interna-
tional community. President Bouteflika insists
that he will provide reparations to victims and
exclude those who have raped, committed
massacres, or placed bombs in public places
from the amnesty provisions, but the Charter
does not provide for truth-seeking mechanisms
or other forms of accounting for the country’s
violent past. 
ASIA
CHINA’S RATIFICATION OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL
AND POLITICAL RIGHTS
In early September the government of
the People’s Republic of China (PRC) stated
that it was making preparations to ratify the
International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR), which it signed in
1998. China scholars and human rights
activists assert that the PRC government has
resisted ratification of the ICCPR to main-
tain control over the right to organize, limit
access to information, impose the death
penalty, and restrict other rights set forth
under the ICCPR.
This announcement followed the August
visit of the UN High Commissioner for
Human Rights (UNHCHR), Louise
Arbour, to China. During her visit she
praised China for its rapid economic devel-
opment and expressed her confidence that
China was now in a better economic posi-
tion to strengthen its legal system and ratify
the ICCPR. She stressed that “China must
tie its economic growth to faster improve-
ments in the legal and political rights of its
citizens.” In particular, her discussions
focused on China’s weak legal system, wide-
spread use of the death penalty, and system
of “re-education through labor (RTL),”
which results in detentions without trial. 
The PRC government was reluctant to
respond directly to the UNHCHR’s
inquiries regarding the death penalty and the
RTL system, where over 250,000 Chinese
individuals are held currently and can be
detained up to four years without trial.
China has the highest number of executions
in the world. Amnesty International esti-
mates that between 3,400 and 10,000 peo-
ple are executed per year in China. Although
the government was unwilling to release the
number or nature of executions, Arbour
commended the government for its
announcement in October 2004 that it
would send its death penalty cases to its
Supreme Court for review under its
Criminal Procedural Law. Prior to this
amendment, the lower courts imposed 90
percent of death penalty sentences. 
Arbour’s five-day visit to China culmi-
nated with a Memorandum of
Understanding between the PRC Ministry
of Foreign Affairs and the UNHCHR enti-
tled “Concerning the Agreement to
Cooperate on the Formulation and
Establishment of a Technical Cooperation
33 4
Human Rights Brief, Vol. 13, Iss. 1 [2005], Art. 8
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/hrbrief/vol13/iss1/8
Program.” The objective of the agreement is
for the UNHCHR, which has a dual man-
date to execute technical cooperation pro-
grams and supervise the implementation of
international human rights treaties, to work
together with the PRC government to ratify
the ICCPR. 
CENSORSHIP IN CHINA
The PRC Government also announced
in September that it would no longer treat
death toll figures from natural disasters as
state secrets. The declassification of these fig-
ures should allow Chinese officials and state
media to report information from natural
disasters as they unfold instead of waiting for
the official version. The press conference
announcing the new provision, however, did
not allow foreign reporters to attend. 
The PRC’s state secrets system is com-
plex, vague, and overbroad. The government
does not merely consider matters of national
security as state secrets, but it may regard any
information that has not been officially
approved for publication or distribution as a
state secret. The state secrets system prevents
Chinese citizens from accessing critical infor-
mation and creates a climate of self-censor-
ship. Moreover, information that is already
publicly available can be considered a state
secret if it falls into the hands of a foreign
entity, and any information can be classified
retroactively based on the consequences of
disclosing such information. This pervasive
system implies that even if death toll figures
of national disasters are no longer marked as
state secrets, the government will continue to
tightly restrict access to this information.
Despite reduced censorship through the
declassification of death toll information, the
government continues to arrest journalists
and tighten the flow of information over an
already censored Internet. Moreover, major
U.S. corporations continue to cooperate with
the PRC government to censor and arrest its
Internet users. In September, Yahoo! Inc. was
accused of helping the PRC government
arrest journalist Shi Tao by providing email
communication as evidence that he was
sending information deemed state secrets to
foreign entities. Yahoo! defended its actions
by claiming that it was complying with
Chinese law. Yahoo! and Google are among
the major U.S.-based companies that have
received criticism from the media, human
rights organizations, press freedom organiza-
tions, and consumers for conforming to gov-
ernment regulations that restrict freedom of
expression and access to information.
Shi Tao, a journalist in Hunan Province,
attended a meeting prior to the 15th
anniversary of the June 4th Democracy
Movement, to commemorate the day when
the Chinese military opened fire on tens of
thousands of unarmed students and other
civilians protesting for democratic reform in
Tiananmen Square. At the meeting he and
his colleagues received verbal instructions
from his communist party boss regarding
coverage of the anniversary. Shi Tao then
emailed his meeting notes using his private
Yahoo! email account to an overseas Chinese
democracy organization. As a result, he was
charged with illegally revealing state secrets
abroad and sentenced to ten years in prison.
Shi Tao is one of China’s 100 million
Internet users who are subject to strict regula-
tions of the Internet. At the end of
September, in the first major policy update on
the Internet since 2000, the government
increased censorship of the Internet. The new
rules forbid major Chinese websites from
posting opinion pieces or commentaries by
users, and only allow Internet postings from
government-controlled newspapers and news
agencies. Additionally, private individuals or
groups are now required to register as “news
organizations” before they can generate and
use email distribution lists that spread news or
commentary. This rule raises fears that indi-
viduals and private organizations will no
longer be able to legally distribute informa-
tion via email since they are unlikely to
receive “news organization” status.
ELECTIONS IN AFGHANISTAN
One year after Afghanistan’s presidential
election, parliamentary and provincial elec-
tions were held on September 18, 2005.
These elections were intended to occur
simultaneously with the presidential election
but had been delayed twice. Whereas last
year’s election resulted in a 75 percent
turnout, this election generated just over 50
percent turnout, with approximately six mil-
lion people voting in the country’s 34
provinces. The decreased voter turnout
results from a number of factors, including
the climate of fear generated from the threat
of violence leading up to the elections, the
large number of candidates (each person
only votes for one of the 5,800 candidates
running for 249 seats in the Wolesi Jirga, the
lower house of the parliament), and a con-
fusing and lengthy ballot.
These elections represent a significant
step for a country that has undergone sever-
al tumultuous decades and is now working
to rebuild its infrastructure, economy, and
judicial system. Nonetheless, human rights
concerns over the fairness and legitimacy of
the political process remain. In the month
prior to the elections, threats of violence and
attacks on government workers, coalition
and Afghan military forces, police, election
workers, potential voters, and candidates
fostered a climate of fear and contributed to
a distorted campaign and election process.
Intimidation from warlords and attacks
from the Taliban and other insurgent forces
have also undermined the campaigning
process and voter participation, particularly
in the south and rural areas. Some candidates
were afraid to discuss key political issues, trav-
el to remote areas, or even participate in the
process, while other candidates are known
warlords who have been accused of human
rights abuses. Although election rules prevent
those who have been convicted of crimes or
are connected with armed militias from run-
ning for office, no present tribunal system
exists to prosecute Afghan warlords and oth-
ers implicated for human rights abuses. 
Even though 25 percent of the seats were
constitutionally guaranteed to women in
this election, women only represented 12
percent of the candidates for the lower house
of parliament and eight percent for the
provincial council. Many women withdrew
from the process, citing procedural issues,
security threats, challenges to campaigning
in rural areas, and limited financial
resources. Although the security issues and
threats of violence exist for both male and
female candidates and voters, women have
been especially targeted. Nonetheless, it
appears this election generated slightly more
participation from female voters, with 44
percent of women registered to vote, com-
pared to the 41 percent who registered dur-
ing the presidential election. HRB
Sebastian Amar, a J.D. candidate at the Washington
College of Law, covers Latin America for the Human
Rights Brief.
Shirley Woodward, a J.D. candidate at the Washington
College of Law, covers Africa for the Human Rights
Brief.
Huwaida Arraf, a J.D. candidate at the Washington
College of Law, covers the Middle East for the Human
Rights Brief.
Amy Tai, a J.D. candidate at the Washington College of
Law, covers Asia for the Human Rights Brief.
34 5
Amar et al.: International Legal Updates
Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2005
